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Abstract
A novel integrated optical source capable of emitting faint pulses with
different polarization states and with different intensity levels at 100 MHz
has been developed. The source relies on a single laser diode followed by
four semiconductor optical amplifiers and thin film polarizers, connected
through a fiber network. The use of a single laser ensures high level of
indistinguishability in time and spectrum of the pulses for the four differ-
ent polarizations and three different levels of intensity. The applicability
of the source is demonstrated in the lab through a free space quantum
key distribution experiment which makes use of the decoy state BB84
protocol. We achieved a lower bound secure key rate of the order of 3.64
Mbps and a quantum bit error ratio as low as 1.14× 10−2 while the lower
bound secure key rate became 187 bps for an equivalent attenuation of
35 dB. To our knowledge, this is the fastest polarization encoded QKD
system which has been reported so far. The performance, reduced size,
low power consumption and the fact that the components used can be
space qualified make the source particularly suitable for secure satellite
communication.
1 Introduction
Quantum key Distribution (QKD), guarantees absolutely secure key distribu-
tion, since making use of the principles of quantum physics [1], using the fact
that it is not possible to measure or copy an unknown quantum state without
being detected [2]. A cryptographic key is generated out from the measurement
of the information encoded into specific quantum states of a photon (e.g. polar-
ization or phase). The first QKD scheme, proposed by Bennett and Brassard [3],
employed single photons sent through a quantum channel, plus classical com-
munications over a public channel to generate a secure shared key. This scheme
is commonly known as the BB84 protocol. Attenuated laser pulses or faint pulse
sources (FPS), which in average emit less than one photon per pulse, are often
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used as signals in practical QKD devices. With the introduction of the decoy
state protocol [4–6], faint pulse systems can offer comparable QKD security with
respect to single photon sources, in particular for high loss situations [7].
Current photon-detector technology and optical guiding media losses limit
QKD on Earth to 250 km in optical fibers [8] and 144 km in free-space links [9].
The unique features of space can potentially offer extremely long propagation
paths, essential for the realization of a global QKD network [10, 11]. Never-
theless, many components of the system, besides the source, require special
attention for the implementation of QKD. The development of a source suitable
for space, apart from the optical design, requires a demanding opto-mechanical
engineering as well as high level of integration with the electronics.
In this paper, we report the development of a novel, compact and reliable
FPS-based semiconductor optical amplifiers (SOAs) which emits pulses at a
repetition rate of 100 MHz, suitable for free-space QKD applications. It has
been measured that the source achieves a Lower Bound Secure Key Rate of 3.64
Mbps implementing the decoy state BB84 protocol. The source is capable of
generating pulses with at least three different intensity levels (i.e. number of
photons per pulse) and four different polarization states. The demonstrated FPS
ensures high level of indistinguishability among the different intensity and polar-
ization pulses and ensures phase incoherence of consecutive generated states. It
is based on a single diode emitting a continuous optical train of pulses externally
modulated in intensity and polarization by using a combination of four SOAs
and polarizing optical elements. The wavelength, reduced power consumption,
compactness and space qualifiable optoelectronic components constituting the
source make it very suitable for space-based QKD transmission. Although the
proposed source has been conceived for free space QKD at around 850 nm, the
concept can be extended to other wavelengths (e.g. 1550 nm) and other media,
including optical fibers.
2 The compact faint pulse source
In order to use it for space applications, the proposed integrated FPS source
consists of space-qualified discrete components (Figure 1): a single semiconduc-
tor laser diode emits a continuous train of optical pulses at 100 MHz, equally
split to four outputs using three in-fiber single-mode 1x2 couplers. Each fiber
output is followed by an integrated (waveguide) SOA. The four bare fibers to the
coupling tube are accurately positioned on a custom opto-mechanical mount to
simultaneously achieve the correct launching to the polarizers substrate sheet as
well as to introduce a desired 70 dB coupling-loss to work in the single-photon
regime at the end of the output bare fiber. Each polarizer is accurately oriented
to produce one of the four polarizations (0◦, 90◦,45◦and −45◦) required for
BB84 protocol. Finally, the output fiber can be connected to the corresponding
optical link interface (e.g. a telescope for free-space communication or optical
fiber for terrestrial links).
The distributed feedback (DFB) laser diode (LD) source is directly modulated
2
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Figure 1: Schematic of the QKD source. [LD] denotes a laser diode, [C] a
single-mode in-fiber 1x2 coupler, [SOA] a semiconductor optical amplifier, [P] a
free-space thin-film polarizer and [BF] a single-mode bare fiber.
at 100 MHz by a train of electrical pulses of about 1 ns duration. The generated
optical pulses do not have any phase coherence among them due to the fact that
the laser is set below and above threshold from one pulse to the subsequent one,
thus producing a random phase for each pulse [12]. In this way phase coherence
of consecutive generated states is absent, which otherwise would be detrimental
for the link security. Single-mode 1x2 in-fiber couplers perform the task of
passively splitting the continuous optical pulse train into four equal outputs,
while sufficiently preserving the polarization state linearity generated by the
LD, before entering the SOAs.
For the implementation of a QKD system using decoy state protocol, besides
four different polarization states (0◦, 90◦,45◦and −45◦), the FPS source should
generate three intensity levels (optimally 1/2, 1/8 and 0 photons in average per
pulse [13, 14]) in order to operate in the single photon regime while optimiz-
ing the decoy state protocol. Each SOA performs the double task of spatial
switching and amplitude modulation; it selects a specific fiber output while,
by changing the driving voltage, it generates the three intensity levels needed
for the decoy state protocol. Note that the spatial switching among the four
fiber outputs is then transformed in polarization modulation, according to the
scheme described above, by going through different polarizing patterns of the
polarizers substrate. In this way intensity and polarization modulation can be
achieved with high extinction ratio (ER), without the need of using Polariza-
tion Maintaining Fibers (PMFs) and PMF couplers or the complexity of having
to maintain a specific input polarization state or high Degree of Polarization
(DOP) along the whole optical assembly. Usually, the common parameter of
interest for a SOA is the gain. However in this case the frequency response to
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an electrical signal is equally important, in particular for the time and spectral
indistinguishability of the pulses with different polarizations and energy levels.
A single LD outperforms, as commented in Section 4, the achievable security
of the qubits sent by the source compared to using more than one LD, while
using a DFB LD generates short optical pulses close to transform limited pulses
which ensures the correct functionality and minimum additional distortion of
any subsequent optical devices and components. The time duration and spectral
bandwidth product of the generated pulses is 0.56, very close to the theoretical
value for transform limited Gaussian pulses (0.44). The main reason of using
SOAs as active switching and intensity selection devices is their high ER (>
20 dB) which is highly desirable when implementing 3-state decoy protocol.
SOAs outperform other solutions such as Mach-Zehnder or Electro-absorptive
modulators which have lower ER when operated with optical pulses as input
signal. Finally, thin-film polarizers achieve high DOP of the order of 99.68%,
being a remarkable specification in order to ensure an adequate quantum bit
error ratio and thus high efficiency of secure key generation rate. Polarization
modulators can not achieve such high values of DOP.
3 Experimental measurements
Figure 2 shows the train of optical pulses generated by the laser diode when
driven by electrical pulses of 1 ns at 100 MHz. The resulting optical pulse dura-
tion is about 400 ps. Since all optical pulses are generated in the same way, by
direct modulation of the laser diode, they can be assumed to be indistinguish-
able. The laser diode is driven in direct modulation with a strong RF driving
pulse with 24 mA DC bias current (below threshold, 36 mA). Furthermore, the
short optical pulse duration of 400 ps has the advantage of increasing the signal-
to-noise ratio, since the measurement window (detection time) in the receiver
side can small.
In Figure 3, the pulses with different intensities required to implement the
decoy state protocol are shown for all the four SOAs, together with the driving
signals, loaded with a 50Ω resistance for monitoring purposes. Notice that the
modulation time window of the driving signals is much larger (> 5 ns) than
the optical pulse thus minimum distortion is produced. A continuous periodic
sequence, driving the four SOAs at the same time, is used to set the intensity
level of a single SOA while the other three SOAs remaining in the OFF state. In
particular, the three intensity levels correspond to: a high intensity level state
which is set to 1/2 average photon per pulse by adjusting the coupling efficiency
to the output bare fiber; then a second lower intensity level and the third level
is set as vacuum (the SOA is not switched ON).
It is clear that the optical pulses from the SOAs have Amplified Spontaneous
Emission (ASE) noise reducing the indistinguishability of the different states,
this can be mitigated by using proper filters, as shown in Figure 4, and/or
selection of SOAs. In fact, SOAs 2 and 3 produce nearly identical pulses without
the use of any filter.
4
0 10 20 30 40
0
1
2
3
4
5
Time [ns]
Po
w
er
 [m
W
]
 
 
50
−80
−70
−60
−50
−40
−30
−20
−10
0
Cu
rre
nt
 [m
A]
Laser output
Laser driver output
Laser current threshold
Figure 2: Optical pulse train generation. Laser driver output (upper curve,
right axis) produces few-ns, negative-going pulses which drive the DFB laser
briefly above threshold (dashed-line, right axis). The laser output (lower curve,
left axis), shows pulses with 100 MHz repetition rate and sub-ns duration.
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(a) Drivers’ outputs.
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(b) Optical outputs.
Figure 3: Driving signals to the four SOAs (a) and corresponding generated
optical pulses (b), as required for the implementation of the decoy state BB84
protocol. Note that the driving voltages are such that the peak optical intensities
from the four SOAs are similar.
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Figure 4: Generated optical pulses after extensively removing ASE using a 3nm
interference filter with central peak wavelength of 852nm.
4 Source security analysis
In all QKD implementations it is important to assess the actual security of the
system, considering the imperfections of the different devices assembled. In this
section the security of the presented source is computed with time and frequency
resolution higher than the temporal and spectral shape widths of the generated
optical pulses. Figure 5 shows the temporal and spectral shapes of pulses with
same intensity level and four different polarization states, filtered ASE, where
an offset has been introduced in the vertical axis only for visualization purposes
otherwise the pulses would highly overlap in intensity. A 8 GHz amplified
photodiode and a 4 MHz resolution Fabry-Perot interferometer were used for
the temporal and spectral measurements on indistinguishability, respectively,
showing a high degree of similarity of the generated optical pulses.
Mutual information is the information shared by two random variables, X
and Y : it measures how much knowing one of these variables reduces the uncer-
tainty on the other. For example, if X and Y are independent, then knowing X
does not give any information about Y and vice versa, so their mutual informa-
tion is zero. On the other extreme, if X and Y are identical then all information
conveyed by X is shared with Y : knowing X determines the value of Y and vice
versa. Formally, the mutual information of two continuous random variables X
and Y is defined as
I(X ;Y ) =
∫
Y
∫
X
p (x, y) log
(
p (x, y)
p (x) p (y)
)
dx dy (1)
where I(X ;Y ) is the mutual information and p (x, y) is the joint probability
distribution between X and Y variables, p (x) and p (y) are the probability
distributions of X and Y variables, respectively.
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(b) Spectral profiles.
Figure 5: Temporal (a) and spectral (b) profiles for pulses with same intensity
level (high) and four different polarization states, where an offset has been
introduced in the vertical axis only for visualization purposes. As expected,
these show a high degree of similarity, indicating minimal distortion of the
pulses.
In particular, in FPS sources it is interesting to compute the average mutual
information between the different bits sent B and the physical parameters that
could lead to side-channels, thus leaking information of the generated secure
key to Eve if not accounted for. For the presented source, with filtered ASE,
the mutual information for the relevant physical parameters with respect to the
bit value B are computed below:
• Spatial: The coupling output fiber also serves as a spatial filter, removing
higher order modes. Because of the short length of the output SMF fiber
(few centimeters) there might be still information transmitted by the fiber
cladding. However this information leakage I(S : B) is of the order of 10−5
bits per pulse.
• Spectral: The mutual information between the bit value B and the spectra
F : I(F : B) = 1.75× 10−3 bits per pulse.
• Temporal: The mutual information between the bit value B and the tem-
poral shape T : I(T : B) = 1.92× 10−3 bits per pulse, when removing the
ASE. If the ASE is not removed, considering the generated optical pulses
from the four particular SOAs available, the mutual information computes
to I(T : B) = 7.25 × 10−2 bits per pulse, mainly because of high levels
of ASE in SOAs 1 and 4. If SOAs were pre-selected to have low ASE the
I(T : B) could achieve the 10−3 bits per pulse order again.
Notice that in Figure 5(a) different pulses are superimposed achieving a
good temporal overlap by careful matching the fiber’s length with an accuracy
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of 1mm, not being necessary to further temporally adjust the overlap of the dif-
ferent optical pulses by using extra delay-adjustment hardware. Furthermore,
it is clear that not perfect transform limited optical pulses are generated thus
even similar optical pulses in their temporal and spectral envelopes could have
distinguishing features in their phases. Using a single initial laser diode, consid-
ering that the distortion due to subsequent optical components is negligible (e.g.
no significant chirp is introduced) because they are operated over a time scale
much larger than the actual optical pulse duration, it ensures no distinguish-
ing features in particular in the phases of the different optical pulses. While
using initially different laser diodes, distinguishing features can be present in
the phase of the different optical pulses which can not be avoided by proper
filtering.
5 QKD free-space transmission
Figure 6 shows the setup used for the decoy state BB84 transmission measure-
ment. The output bare fiber was connected to a free-space collimator pointing
to the polarization-sensitive detection module, a.k.a. “Bob module” commonly
used for polarization-encoded QKD. The polarization detection fidelity, defined
as the ratio between erroneous detected polarization states to total detected
polarization states which defines the capability to correctly resolve the received
polarization states, of the receiver module used in the experiment was 7.9×10−3.
Alice and Bob time references were synchronized using a classical channel pro-
viding a 10 MHz clock signal. The detections from the single-photon detectors
(SAPD) were recorded by a timetagging unit and then transferred to a com-
puter to derive the relevant parameters (e.g. Lower Bound Secure Key Rate
(LBSKR), Raw Key Rate (RKR) and Quantum Bit Error Ratio (QBER)). The
parameters of interest were extrapolated using enough accumulated detections
in a burst mode operation, which for high RKR it accounted for about 100 ms
while for the lowest RKR it accounted for 16.6 minutes. The timetagging unit
allows 10 Mcps transmission to the computer, by direct memory access (DMA),
and also it has a timestamp resolution of 78.125 ps. Accounting for 500 ps jitter
of SAPD (Perkin Elmer SPCM-AQ4C), 100 ps jitter and 400 ps of the width of
the generated optical pulses, a 1 ns time window was implemented by software,
allowing to reduce the background noise.
The free-space link was emulated in the laboratory by placing different neu-
tral density attenuators along the propagation path from Alice (the source) to
Bob (the receiver). We then measured the rates and performances of the QKD
decoy state BB84 protocol using the presented source. In the implementation
of the BB84 protocol, only single-photon pulses contribute to the secure key,
while in the 3-state decoy state protocol the full range of intensities should be
considered.
All but privacy amplification was implemented, were the lower bound for the
8
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Figure 6: Schematic of the QKD measurement setup. Alice module is composed
of the FPS also providing a common clock signal of 10 MHz in order to syn-
chronize Alice and Bob modules. [C] denotes a fiber to free-space collimator,
[NDF] a neutral density filter, [NPBS] a non-polarizing beamsplitter, [HWP]
a half-wave plate, [PBS] a polarizing beamsplitter and [SAPD] a single-photon
detector.
secure key generation rate can be obtained as (security proof derived in [5, 6])
R ≥ q
Nµ
t
{−Qµf (Eµ)H2 (Eµ) +Q1 [1−H2 (e1)]} (2)
where q depends on the implementation (1/2 for the BB84 protocol), Nµ is the
total number of signal pulses sent, t is the time duration of the QKD transmis-
sion, µ represents the intensity of the signal states, Qµ is the gain of the signal
states, Eµ is the signal pulses QBER, Q1 is the gain of single photon states, e1
is the error rate of single photon states, f (x) is the bi-direction error correction
efficiency (taken as 1.16 [15], for an error ratio of 1%) and H2 (x) is the binary
Shannon information function, given by
H2 (x) = −x log2 (x)− (1− x) log2 (1− x) (3)
6 Results and discussion
Figure 3 shows the SOAs’ capability to be driven at 100 MHz while achieving
spatial switching operation and intensity level generation, suitable for decoy
state BB84 protocol. In addition low driving voltages are needed, making the
design suitable for electronic integration with low electrical power consumption
drivers. Furthermore, by design, the phase of each pulse varies at random
between pulses due to the fact that, as it was already mentioned, pulses are
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Table 1: Summary of the QKD results for a BB84 transmission, implementing
the decoy state protocol. The obtained values are for a 6 dB attenuation, where
µ, ν1 and ν2 are the signal, decoy 1 and decoy 2 (ideally vacuum) states. The
computed values are the gains for the signal Qµ, decoy 1 Qν1 , decoy 2 Qν2 states
and the QBER for the signal states eµ. Finally the lower bound of the secure
key rate Rsecure, for the presented source, is 3.64 Mbps with a QBER as low as
1.14× 10−2 while a Rsecure of 187 bps for an attenuation as high as 35 dB.
Parameter Value Parameter Value
Attenuation 6 dB Qµ 1.18× 10
−1
µ 0.5 Qv1 1.8× 10
−2
ν1 6.6× 10
−2 Qv2 3× 10
−3
ν2 2× 10
−3 eµ 1.14× 10
−2
Rsecure 3.64 Mbps f (Eµ) 1.16
generated by taking continuously the laser diode above and below threshold, as
explained in [12].
The level of indistinguishability is directly reflected on the amount of Se-
cure Key Rate (SKR) that has to be removed in the privacy amplification step,
in order to ensure security. The amount of bits to be removed when filtering
with interference filters (10−3 bits per pulse) can be achieved without using an
interference filter but pre-selecting four SOAs with similar low ASE values. Con-
sidering the above values for I(S : B), I(F : B) and I(T : B) the corresponding
information leakage is small compared to the information leakage indicated by
the QBER of the contribution of pulses with more than one photon.
Figure 7 shows the detected RKR and QBER, and the resulting LBSKR,
for different link attenuations. In the transmission measurement the detectors’
efficiency was set to 50%, 2 dB were accounted for losses due to the transmit-
ting and receiving optical setup with a background yield of 5.58 × 10−4. The
background yield Y0 includes the detectors’ dark count and other background
contributions from stray light [14] being for larger distances the major cause of
secure key rate drop. As expected, for signal rates well above the noise floor
the RKR decreases exponentially as the attenuation increases, so does the LB-
SKR. When the signal rate decreases the noise starts to dominate, so the QBER
increases rapidly as well as the LBSKR, until the QBER is > 0.11 when the
LBSKR drops completely to zero. In particular, results for the emulated de-
coy state BB84 protocol transmission, for a particular attenuation of 6 dB, are
shown in Table 1. We have achieved a LBSKR of 3.64 Mbps with a QBER as
low as 1.14×10−2 for an attenuation of 6 dB while the achieved LBSKR became
187 bps for an attenuation as high as 35 dB.
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Figure 7: QKD BB84 implementing decoy states transmission results. Raw
Key Rate (blue solid line), Lower Bound Secure Key Rate (red dashed line) and
QBER (magenta dotted line). The detectors’ efficiency was set to 50%, back-
ground yield 5.58×10−4, 2 dB were accounted for losses due to the transmitting
and receiving optical systems.
7 Conclusions
We have shown that a single photon source based on an attenuated laser diode
for QKD applications can be built based on a novel scheme including semicon-
ductor optical amplifiers. The source is capable of generating pulses of random
polarization distributed over four states and three intensity levels required for
decoy state BB84 protocol. A lower bound secure key rate of 3.64 Mbps with a
quantum bit error ratio as low as 1.14×10−2 for an attenuation of 6 dB. To our
knowledge, this is the fastest polarization encoded QKD system which has been
reported so far. Given the relatively low driving voltages of the SOAs, the laser
diode and the other integrated optical components, the proposed transmitter is
potentially low power consumption, highly integrable and stable. The experi-
mental demonstration has been carried out at 850 nm, for the implementation
in free-space links, with 100 MHz generation rates. However, taking into con-
sideration that the SOA’s bandwidth can go well beyond 10 GHz and operate
also at other wavelengths (e.g. 1310 nm and 1550 nm for fiber transmission),
the source can be easily scalable to higher bit rates, the upper limit probably
being set by the laser diode itself.
11
Acknowledgments
This work was carried out with the financial support of the Ministerio de
Educacio´n y Ciencia (Spain) through grants TEC2010-14832, FIS2007-60179,
FIS2008-01051 and Consolider Ingenio CSD2006-00019, and also by the Euro-
pean Space Agency under ARTES-5 telecom programme Contract No. 21460/08/NL/IA.
References
[1] C. H. Bennett and G. Brassard, “Quantum cryptography: Public-key distri-
bution and coin tossing,” Proceedings of IEEE International Conference on
Computers, Systems and Signal Processing, pp. 175–179, December 1984.
[2] V. Scarani, S. Iblisdir, N. Gisin, and A. Ac´ın, “Quantum cloning,” Rev.
Mod. Phys., vol. 77, no. 4, pp. 1225–1256, Nov 2005.
[3] C. H. Bennett, F. Bessette, G. Brassard, L. Salvail, and J. Smolin, “Exper-
imental quantum cryptography,” Journal of Cryptology, vol. 5, no. 1, pp.
3–28, 1992.
[4] W.-Y. Hwang, “Quantum key distribution with high loss: Toward global
secure communication,” Phys. Rev. Lett., vol. 91, 057901, no. 5, p. 057901,
Aug 2003.
[5] X.-B. Wang, “Beating the photon-number-splitting attack in practical
quantum cryptography,” Phys. Rev. Lett., vol. 94, 230503, no. 23, p. 4,
Jun 2005.
[6] H.-K. Lo, X. Ma, and K. Chen, “Decoy State Quantum Key Distribution,”
Phys. Rev. Lett., vol. 94, 230504, no. 23, p. 4, Jun 2005.
[7] S. Nauerth, M. Fu¨rst, T. Schmitt-Manderbach, H. Weier, and H. Wein-
furter, “Information leakage via side channels in freespace BB84 quantum
cryptography,” New Journal of Physics, vol. 11, 065001, no. 6, p. 8, 2009.
[8] D. Stucki, N. Walenta, F. Vannel, R. T. Thew, N. Gisin, H. Zbinden,
S. Gray, C. R. Towery, and S. Ten, “High rate, long-distance quantum key
distribution over 250 km of ultra low loss fibres,” New Journal of Physics,
vol. 11, 075003, no. 7, p. 9, 2009.
[9] T. Schmitt-Manderbach, H. Weier, M. Fu¨rst, R. Ursin, F. Tiefenbacher,
T. Scheidl, J. Perdigues, Z. Sodnik, C. Kurtsiefer, A. Rarity, J. G. Zeilinger,
and H. Weinfurter, “Experimental Demonstration of Free-Space Decoy-
State Quantum Key Distribution over 144 km,” Phys. Rev. Lett., vol. 98,
010504, no. 1, 2007.
[10] J. M. Perdigues, B. Furch, C. J. Matos, O. Minster, L. Cacciapuoti,
M. Pfennigbauer, M. Aspelmeyer, T. Jennewein, R. Ursin, T. Schmitt-
Manderbach, G. Baister, J. Rarity, W. Leeb, C. Barbieri, H. Weinfurter,
12
and A. Zeilinger, “Quantum communications at ESA: Towards a space ex-
periment on the ISS,” Acta Astronautica, vol. 63, no. 1-4, pp. 165–178,
March 2008.
[11] R. Ursin, T. Jennewein, J. Kofler, J. M. Perdigues, L. Cacciapuoti, C. J.
de Matos, M. Aspelmeyer, A. Valencia, T. Scheidl, A. Fedrizzi, A. Acin,
C. Barbieri, G. Bianco, C. Brukner, J. Capmany, S. Cova, D. Giggen-
bach, W. Leeb, R. H. Hadfield, R. Laflamme, N. Lutkenhaus, G. Milburn,
M. Peev, T. Ralph, J. Rarity, R. Renner, E. Samain, N. Solomos, W. Tit-
tel, J. P. Torres, M. Toyoshima, A. Ortigosa-Blanch, V. Pruneri, P. Vil-
loresi, I. Walmsley, G. Weihs, H. Weinfurter, M. Zukowski, and A. Zeilinger,
“Space-quest: Experiments with quantum entanglement in space,” Euro-
physics News, vol. 40, no. 3, pp. 26–29, 2009.
[12] M. Jofre, A. Gardelein, G. Anzolin, G. Molina-Terriza, J. P. Torres, M. W.
Mitchell, and V. Pruneri, “100MHz Amplitude and PolarizationModulated
Optical Source for Free-Space Quantum Key Distribution at 850 nm,” IEEE
Journal of Lightwave Technology, vol. 28, no. 17, pp. 2572–2578, Sept. 2010.
[13] X.-B. Wang, “Decoy-state protocol for quantum cryptography with four
different intensities of coherent light,” Phys. Rev. A, vol. 72, 012322, no. 1,
p. 6, Jul 2005.
[14] X. Ma, B. Qi, Y. Zhao, and H.-K. Lo, “Practical decoy state for quantum
key distribution,” Phys. Rev. A, vol. 72, 012326, no. 1, p. 15, Jul 2005.
[15] G. Brassard and L. Salvail, “Secret Key Reconciliation by Public Discus-
sion,” Advances in Cryptology - EUROCRYPT ’93, vol. 765/1994, pp. 410–
423, 1994.
13
